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health system in the network is independently and
Abstract The high-level sensitivity of medical information autonomously managed by the healthcare providers
mandates stronger authentication and authorization mechanisms with authority to control access to their locally
to be used in e-Health systems. This paper describes the design v
and implementation of certificate-based e-Health authentication managed patient health data and information. In
and authorization architecture. This architecture was developed addition, the healthcare providers are responsible for
to authenticate e-Health professionals accessing shared clinical defining access-rules to protect resources and each
data among a set of affiliated health institutions based on peer-to-
peer networks. The architecture had to accommodate specific rinsiits on setaof iconcerns. tAlo leal
medical data sharing and handling requirements, namely the responsibilities and accountabilities pertinent to health
security of professionals' credentials. data collection and management are the driving force
behind healthcare providers guarding patient data and
Index Terms-E-Health, Security, Authentication, P2P, related information securely.
Attribute Certificates, Identity Certificates, Patient Consent. Therefore, research in secure mechanisms to prevent
I. INTRODUCTION and protect the confidential information and privacy-
With increasingmobilityof populatisensitive patient data as well as fostering trust between
Withbe dincreasing mobilit nyopopations, patienterata healthcare consumers and providers is paramount in e-may be distributed over many locations in different helhifatuur.Itispe,wecndrte
electronic.healthcare.ehalhsytm. Rcnl, ho health infrastructure. In this paper, we consider theel ctronic lthcare ( - e lth) s s ems. e ently, w atetcto rbe o ewre ut-eme
to access this distributed patient data to provide the best heathcatems The uofnetworked heatce
possible care has received attention both from y
governments, healthcare providers and researchers [5]. systems is generally controlled by authenticating and
Advances in networking technology make it possible to authorizing particular users and uses.
interconnect these independent and geographically Authentication is the process where a networked
distributed e-health systems such that healthcare resource user establishes a right to an identity.
professionals (i.e., doctors, nurses, etc.) are able to Authorization and authentication framework is a
access patient health data and related information from necessary tool for deploying and using a reliable,
secure and trustworthy e-health system. A large
any~~~ ~loato at any..tie.o xape sn number of techniques may be used to authenticate ainterconnected e-health infrastructure, data like images
and lab results can be communicated rather fast and thus user: passwords, biometric techniques, smart cards, and
guarantee an optimized care process. However, given the digital certificates. Generally, the authentication
highly sensitive nature of personal health data, the methods used should match the value of the data being
protectionof dat.a. 'b. . accessed. It should also correspond to the type and
confidentialdtya irity availab ancity level of access the user is providing. Moreover, a
confidentt ad pmethod of user authentication is needed that imposes apersonal data protection regulations are critical factors .. ..
towards achieving users' trust and acceptance of e-health Inimum adion woroaone user.
systems [6]. ~~~~~~Inthis paper, we propose an authenticationWhlem t. i framework for distributed and multidisciplinary team
e-health systems with multilevel administrativeprofessionals have access to the necessary patient data y
and information to do their job the best way, increasing doains th ori goa ofsthi ste is tovproduena
automation of the electronic medical record presents, u a
among others, significant patient privacy and cosstn of ditiue eore sd b
confidentiality issues that could expose the healthcare gorpial n diitaieydsrbtdues
.~~~~~~The proposed authentication protocol iS based onproviers nduers o libilit. Moeove, eah e- digital certificates that convey identity, use-constraints,
and attributes. The proposed protocol offers a number
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of advantages such as user-friendly access to remotely Without proper authentication mechanism, the
managed patient data and related information, it does provision, continuity and safety of health care system
not require a vast amount of ongoing maintenance, could easily be compromised. A large number of
provides strong authentication and gives confidence techniques may be used to authenticate a user and a
that systems are secure. Moreover, it is suitable for survey of existing tools showed that there is no single
fine-grained access control and guarantees user privacy best approach for providing an authentication and
and confidentiality. It also addresses user authorisation infrastructure for e-health systems [11]. A
accountability, with administrators able to investigate PKI and smart card based e-Health authentication
if improper use is discovered architecture to authenticate health professionals
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In accessing a regional platform for sharing clinical data
Section 2, we outline the related work. The proposed among a set of affiliated health institutions on dedicated
authorization framework is then presented in Section 3. national health network known as Rede Telematica da
The conclusion and future work is discussed in Section Sau(de (RTS) is described in [9].
4. An authorisation and authentication architecture for e-
health services system that integrates the role-based
II. RELATED WORK method [7] and the attribute certificate (or privilege)
In this paper, we refer to e-health system as healthcare based method [3] into the electronic health service
systems and services that are interconnected and can system is discussed in [8]. A fingerprint-based model
work together easily and effectively, while maintaining suitable for medical images privacy protection against
patient and professional confidentiality, privacy, and unauthorised release of images by an authorised
security. We assume a multidisciplinary team recipient is discussed in [10].
environment where patients will be treated by a Existing approaches are based on technical solutions
potentially large team of health providers geographically that are well known in distributed system with a single
distributed in various locations. centralized node controlling the authentication process.
Each healthcare provider operates autonomously The common denominators of these previous approaches
within distinct domain and has different healthcare are generally strongly biased toward a single individual
information systems to support local patient care. The interacting with a single application. Moreover, those
healthcare providers and their systems deal with a whole based on digital certificate and public key infrastructures
range of sensitive issues related to patient information to build and operate authentication or authorisation
such as diagnostic reports, MRI images, pathological test infrastructure is only adopted the identity certificate. An
results, diagnosis reports, prescriptions, and so on. In the identity certificate is an electronic document certificate
rest of the paper, we define healthcare professionals that provides generally recognized proof of identity just
(HP) as any person involved in any kind of health care like a passport, or other personal IDs. Identity
related services that include doctors, nurses, certificates are issued by certificate authorities (CAs) in
administrative staff, support staff and IT staff. much the same way as government agencies issue
Since health professionals have to provide a wide passports after verifying an individual's identity. CAs
range of distinctive services, the roles of various types of can be either independent third parties or organizations
HPs differ widely, which requires differentiated access running their own certificate-issuing server software.
roles to the users of the e-health system. Also, The certificate authority generally uses published
individuals have the right to expect that their identifiable verification procedures to ensure that an entity
health information will not be disclosed without their requesting a certificate is in fact who it claims to be.
express informed consent. Moreover, accessing patient In our previous work, we proposed an e-health
related data must be on-demanding and on need bases. In infrastructure (E-HP2) [5] that provides integrated
addition, as the custodian of patient information, each services to health care workers that are more broadly
healthcare provider is responsible for protecting patient accessible by leveraging P2P technology and electronic
information in patient database against un-authorised health records. In E-HP2, a number of healthcare
use. organisations (e.g., doctors, pathology labs, pharmacies
In general, securing distributed systems continues to and hospitals) willingly collaborate by virtually
be an important research challenge. Authentication in integrating their information systems. E-HP2 enables
such networked e-health system is important and health providers to share patient information in a
challenging. seamless, fault-tolerant and scalable manner. It is
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important to note that the provision of infrastructure Fig. 1 shows the proposed overall operational
services is an enabling mechanism. The infrastructure architecture. We assume that each healthcare
itself will deliver some benefits, but the main outcomes professional (HP) is assigned a set of specific rights
will be achieved by the provision of additional (roles) that governs the permissions needed to
applications and services. accomplish his/her tasks. We propose the use of remote
Although there is a merit for easy accessibility of and local user roles with each requiring different
individual's health information by qualified and authentication mechanisms. First, the healthcare
authorized individuals using P2P network, this could professionals (HP) must be authenticated to the local e-
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that patient data health system. At the second level, there should be a
and related information. This work extends our previous remote access authentication system. These are achieved
work by adding an authentication protocol to make the through two distinct phases.
sharing of patient data and related information in a Initially, every user obtains an identity certificate. We
seamless and secure way. However, authentication assume that each autonomous domain has its own
protocol is more difficult to achieve in a pure P2P Identity Certificate Authority (ICA). We also assume
network architecture than in a centralized environment. that the ICAs in the P2P trust each other. The ICAs are
This is because no central server is used to verify a responsible for the creation, digitally signing and
peer's identity. distribution of the identity certificates to users registered
The proposed protocol is based on a Public-Key in that domain. In a multi-team environment, the issue of
Infrastructure (PKI) that supports the issuing and managing patient consent to the use and disclosure of
management of digital certificates which identify and personal information is paramount. In this paper, we
authenticate authorized users. When a certificate assume that when a patient visits a hospital, the patient
authority issues an identity certificate, it binds a provides his/her consent on the use of her medical data
particular public key to the name of the entity identified and digitally signs the consent form and the consent
in the certificate (such as the name of a doctor). The form is sent to the local data repository.
certificate also has an expiration date, the name of the Local Healthcare Providers Remote Healthcare
certificate authority that issued the certificate and other Healthcare Providers
information. Most importantly, a certificate always ressen t AertibUte
includes the digital signature of the issuing certificate F A
authority. We also use an attribute certificate (AC) has a Credentia e '
data structure comparable to an identity certificate [14]. Attribute -
However, a major difference is that an attribute
certificate does not contain a public key. It contains
aifributes that specify access control information
associated with the AC holder (such as group 2 11 cc Ce
membership, role, and security clearance). Attribute 1Consent
certificates are able to support and implement a CA ACAC
significant part of the authorization process. For
example, information about a user's current role (e.g. Fig. 1: Networked electronic healthcare system.
physician) or a client's ability to pay for a resource For remote authentication, we use attribute and
access may be more important than the client's identity. consent certificates to assign attributes and patient data
use constraints to HP respectively in a verifiable way.
In CdENtriALbASedan AuTHENtidiscATiOn PtOCOLehealt Therefore, the second phase consists of obtaining theIn distributed and multidisciplinary team e-health consent and attribute certificates. The consent certificate
systems with multilevel administrative domains, will impose use-conditions on the patient data. All of the
authentication of the UPs is a must. In this section, we use-conditions must be met simultaneously in order to
discuss the proposed authentication architecture and satisfy the requirements for patient data access. An
protocol. attribute certificate certifies that the user possesses a
A. Authentication Architecture value for a given attribute. An attribute describes a
The interaction of health providers with the system property associated with an individual such as
has to be secured through a complex process Of information that describes the qualifications and
authentication and authorization, authorities granted to the target entity. Each attribute
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certificate may use only the information that is of HP roles from a set of initially assigned roles, which
absolutely necessary to obtain the needed services. are needed to accomplish specific tasks.
Attribute certificate validity period must be within the The HP will then send to the remote gateway (RGW) a
validity period of the identity certificate. A HP may request for data (R) along with the attribute certificate
possess different attribute certificates related to different (AC) and consent certificate (CC). When the RGW
validity intervals or even different purposes. It must be receives the access request from the health professionals,
noted that, generally speaking, attributes are subject to it sends the attribute certificate and the consent
change according to each situation. For example, the certificate to the local attribute certificate authorities
rights of HPs usually consist of both static and very (ACA) and consent certificate authorities (CCA) for
dynamic permissions. As a result, the content of attribute verification respectively. These certificate authorities
certificates varies from case to case. Basically, static generally use published verification procedures to ensure
permissions are issued by health authorities, dynamic that an entity requesting the data is in fact who it claims
permissions may be issued even by hospitals and clinics. to be. Attribute verification is the process of establishing
Static qualification and authorization attributes can also an understood level of confidence that an attribute
be connected with dynamic permissions and admission, applies to a specific individual. The result of the
for example by a supervisor or administrator within the verification step is used by the authorization step which
IT environment of a hospital. is outside the scope of this paper.
The system uses the attribute certificate authority
(ACA) and the individual consent certificate authority RGW HP LGW
(CCA) to control access to information content based on
personal consent, the role of the information-accessing CCA
entity, and the type of information use. ACA issues 6 _ 1. Identity -
attribute certificate that contains authorized person's ver t eCA
attribute and binds to one's public key certificate. It also R, 3 Attribu
verifies the validity of aitribute certificate as well as AC CC ceca
revokes attribute certificate in case of the attribute is AC
changed or is lost. 9 verify certificat ACA
The CCA maintains and serves information about the ACA
consent given by individuals about the use of their
personal health information. We assume that patients are Fig. 2: Authentication protocol.
able to review and adjust consent information through a
web-based interface. The gateway (GW) node at each IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION
participating healthcare providers runs the policy engine Medical data security is an important issue that poses
that determines, based on the roles assigned to HP, the technical organisational and ethical challenges. In this
users' rights with respect to the requested access to paper, we proposed two-level authentication protocol forhealthcare data and resources. Since we focus on remote PPbsdehat ytmta rvdsitgae
exchange of healthcare data between different healthcare services tohealth care provider prosed
providers, we will not discuss the local authentication sevcst halh ar poids.Te rpsdproviders, wehwill n du authentication framework is based on identity, attribute
and consent certificates that together uniquely identify
B. Authentication Protocol the HP as well as the roles and accesses associated and
Fig. 2 shows the steps performed in the proposed constraints imposed on the healthcare data usage. The
authentication mechanism. Specifically, when HP proposed protocol offers a number of advantages
initiates a new session for remote data request; he/she including a user-friendly and strong authentication and
must first identify and authenticate themselves, with the gives confidence that systems are secure. We plan to
local gateway (LGW) server, by using their IC and extend the proposed approach such that it is able to
password. The validated IC of the user is then used by delegate and recognize delegated credentials. We also
the GW to gathers up all the relevant certificates, plan to extend it such that a single-sign on capability is
depending on the responsibility/authority of the HP roles realized.
activated by the request. The GW also ensures that the
HP has the need for the information sought. This step
produces a short-lived attribute certificate with a subset
619
REFERENCES
[1] A. Y. Halevy, Z. G. Ives, D. Suciu, and I. Tatarinov.
Schema Mediation in Peer Data Management Systems. In
ICDE, pages 505-, 2003.
[2] Bearly, T.; Vijay Kumar, "Expanding Trust beyond
Reputation in Peer-to-Peer Systems," Proceedings. 15th
International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems
Applications, pp: 966 - 970, 2004.
[3] Blobel B, Advanced and Secure Architectural HER
Approaches. International Journal of Medical Informatics,
75: 185-190, 2006.
[4] Fahad Al-Naydi, Jemal H. Abawajy, Mustafa Mat Deris:
A Conceptual Framework for Ubiquitously Sharing
Heterogeneous Patient Information among Autonomous
Healthcare Providers. MUE 2007: 299-306, 2007.
[5] Gobuty DE, Defending Medical Information Systems
against Malicious Software. International Congress
Series, 1268: 96-107, 2004.
[6] Gritzalis S., Iliadis J., Gritzalis D., Spinellis D., and
Katsikas S., "Developing Secure Web-based Medical
Applications", Medical Informatics Journal, Vol.24,
No.1, pp.75-90, 1999.
[7] Hitchens M, Varadharajan V, Design and Specification of
Role-based Access Control Policies. IEE Proceedings in
Software, 47(4):117-129, 2000.
[8] Han, Song and Skinner, G. and Potdar, Vidysagar and
Chang, Elizabeth and Wu, Chen, New Framework for
Authentication and Authorization for e-Health Service
Systems, International Conference on Industrial
Technology, pp. 2833-2838, 2006.
[9] Helder Gomes, Joao Paulo Cunha, and Andre Zuiquete,
Authentication Architecture for eHealth Professionals, R.
Meersman and Z. Tari et al. (Eds.): OTM 2007, Part II,
LNCS 4804, pp. 1583-1600, 2007.
[10]Li M, Poovendran R, Narayanan S, Protecting Patient
Privacy against Unauthorised Release of Medical Images
in a Group Communication Environment. Computerized
Medical Imaging and Graphics, 29: 367-383, 2005.
[11] Lopez J, Oppliger R, Pernul G, Authentication and
Authorisation Infrastructure (AAIs): A Comparative
Survey. Computers and Security, 23: 578-590, 2004.
[12] Mike Boniface, Paul Wilken, "ARTEMIS: Towards a
Secure Interoperability Infrastructure for Healthcare
Information Systems," Proceedings of Workshop in
Healthgrid2005, 2005.
[13]Farrel S, Housley R. An Internet Attribute Certificate
Profile for Authorization, IETF Group, Internet Draft:
draft.ietf.pkix.ac5o9prof-03.txt, work in progress. 2000
May.
620
